The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001
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发表时间：
2004-02-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Gintis, H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bowles, S;Gintis, H
人类群体是如何在群体成员间遗传相关性较低的情况下保持高度合作的？我们认为，许多人有一种倾向，惩罚那些违反群体利益规范的人，即使这会给惩罚者带来健康成本。在行为实验和自然环境中，这种利他惩罚被广泛观察到可以维持高水平的合作。我们提供了一个合作和惩罚的模型，我们称之为强互惠：当一个群体的成员从共同遵守社会规范中受益时，强互惠者会遵守规范并惩罚违反者，即使结果是他们得到的回报比其他群体成员低，比如自私的代理人违反规范而不惩罚，而纯粹的合作者遵守规范但从不惩罚，搭便车。我们基于代理的模拟表明，在近似于动物和植物驯化之前10万年的人类环境的假设下，最初罕见的强互惠者的扩散是非常可能的，并且所有三种行为类型的大量频率可以在人群中维持。因此，保持了高水平的合作。我们的研究结果并不要求组成员是相关的，或发生的群体排斥。(C)2003年由Elsevier Inc.出版
How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low level of genetic relatedness among group members? We suggest that many humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this imposes a fitness cost on the punisher. Such altruistic punishment is widely observed to sustain high levels of cooperation in behavioral experiments and in natural settings.We offer a model of cooperation and punishment that we call strong reciprocity: where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish agents who violate the norm and do not punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never punishing. Our agent-based simulations show that, under assumptions approximating likely human environments over the 100,000 years prior to the domestication of animals and plants, the proliferation of strong reciprocators when initially rare is highly likely, and that substantial frequencies of all three behavioral types can be sustained in a population. As a result, high levels of cooperation are sustained. Our results do not require that group members be related or that group extinctions occur. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.