Making Disability Work? The Effects of Financial Incentives on Partially Disabled Workers
Making Disability Work? The Effects of Financial Incentives on Partially Disabled Workers
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让残疾发挥作用？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Koning;Jan
本研究采用纵向管理数据，从荷兰探讨残疾工人的经济激励措施的反应。我们专注于有部分残疾保险（DI）福利的工人，他们有大量的剩余工作能力。当第一阶段的直接入息福利到期时，如果这些工人不利用其剩余收入能力，他们的收入就会急剧下降。享受第一阶段直接保险福利的权利期限因个人而异。这使我们能够估计这种工作激励措施的变化对工作发生率、工资收入和全面恢复工作的影响。根据估计结果，隐含的劳动力不参与弹性率为0.12。年轻的DI接受者的响应估计是最高的，他们通常有较短的权利期，以更慷慨的第一阶段的DI福利。奖励措施的变化对部分残疾工人的工资收入影响有限，对完全恢复工作没有重大影响。
This study uses longitudinal administrative data from the Netherlands to explore the responsiveness of disabled workers to financial incentives. We focus on workers with partial Disability Insurance (DI) benefits that have substantial residual work capacities. When the first phase of benefit entitlement to DI has expired, these workers experience a dramatic drop in income if they do not employ their residual income capacity. Entitlement periods to the first phase of DI benefits vary across individuals. This enables us to estimate the impact effect of this change in work incentives on the incidence of work, on wage earnings and on full work resumption. Based on the estimation results, the implied labor force non-participation elasticity rate equals 0.12. Response estimates are highest among young DI recipients, who typically have shorter entitlement periods to the more generous first phase of DI benefits. The incentive change has a limited impact on wage earnings of partially disabled workers and no significant impact on full work resumption.