Implementing Coordinated Team Play
Implementing Coordinated Team Play
复制标题
实施协调的团队游戏
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2249
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
John S. Hughes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anil Arya;Jonathan C. Glover;John S. Hughes
摘要本文研究了一个联合生产的道德风险模型，其中协调有很强的收益。我们提出的机制，解决在我们的设置中出现的默契勾结问题，利用随意合同，提供代理商的选择，在任何时候退出。经济文献分类号：C72，D82。
Abstract This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at-will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.