: Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism
: Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism
复制标题
: 勃艮第的农民和国王：法国专制主义的土地基础
DOI：
10.1086/600610
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. L. Goff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. L. Goff
864篇书评18世纪60年代和70年代，凡尔赛宫的改革官员如HLJ-B推行的”重农主义”政策就是证明。Bertin，丹尼尔Trudaine，和M.- F.列斐伏尔·德·奥梅松，允许封闭开放的领域和划分公地。鲁特和圣雅各布（Saint-Jacob）对勃艮第本身的看法以及乔治·列斐伏尔（Georges Lefebvre）对诺曼底的看法以及阿伦·戴维斯（Alun Davies）和J·缪塞（J. Musset）等其他历史学家的看法一样，都表明地方行政长官及其下属的代表团不鼓励分割公地和圈地。1770年，皇家颁布法令，允许在勃艮第圈地，但这基本上是失败的。鲁特还指出，皇家政府为了加强乡村自治而进行干预，将领主排除在议会之外，并鼓励农民社区广泛参与，以防止领主和富裕的农民为了自己的利益而操纵它。在阿尔弗雷德·科班之后，他正确地拒绝了圣雅各布关于乡村共同体的浪漫主义观念，当他遇到贫劳者反对分割公共土地的抗议时，他表现出了健康的怀疑态度：这些人可能是富裕的农民，他们的大牧群最能从现有的公共放牧权或公共土地中获利。然而，如果将出席率和投票率与纳税记录进行比较，那么对乡村政治中利害攸关的利益的分析就会得到改善，因为在勃艮第，纳税记录似乎很丰富。地方行政长官的反领主主义也导致他们鼓励或容忍地方自治体对领主提起诉讼--诉讼费用来自地方政府在遵循地方行政长官的建议，出租土地和权利以获取利润而不是疏远他们时所赚的钱。在这里，或许应该提到习惯法的作用，就像罗马法律在Midi（在Midi，这种诉讼也很常见），习惯法使起诉变得更容易，因为人们接受领主有责任证明领主的权利。在这些案件中，村庄很少胜诉，但鲁特说，在这个过程中，农民的政治意识被唤醒，转而反对领主政权;这可能是事实，尽管在他引用的案例中，几乎没有迹象表明农民对领主政权的基本原则提出异议。鲁特说，在地方长官的公平背后，是执行团结契约的需要，整个社会都有义务征收自己的直接税，并为财政官员提供有保证的收入，财政官员反过来又把自己的钱交给国王。作者认为，偏袒村社是一个错误。这一政策不仅给农民带来了虚假的希望，而且还阻止了公地的分裂，阻止了共同放牧权的消亡，并消除了小土地所有者--在鲁特看来，这是法国农业革命的必要先决条件。鲁特提出了新自由主义的经济道德观：“勃艮第农业的停滞是财政政策决定社会和经济发展时会发生什么的一个例子”（第218页）。这一论点在很大程度上是基于信念，似乎是通过望远镜的错误一端看待政策问题。通过将”政府政策”限制在地方长官及其下属代表的行动范围内，鲁特设法找到了一条连贯的路线，但代价是排除了贝尔坦和特鲁丹等政策制定者的工作，他们显然将自己的政治命运与英国模式的农业现代化计划联系在一起。这对根来说，只是一扇窗户。
864 Book Reviews rights. The proof of this was taken to be the" Physiocratic" policy pushed through in the 1760s and 1770s by reforming officials in Versailles such as HLJ-B. Bertin, Daniel Trudaine, and M.-F. Lefevre d'Ormesson, permitting the enclosure of open fields and the division of commons. Root, like Saint-Jacob for Burgundy itself and other historians such as Georges Lefebvre for the Nord and Alun Davies and J. Musset for Normandy, shows that the provincial intendants and their subdelegues discouraged the breakup of commons and enclosure of open fields. And the royal edict of 1770 permitting enclosures in Burgundy was largely a failure. Root also makes a case that the royal government intervened to reinforce village self-government, excluding seigneurs from assemblies and encouraging wide participation by the peasant community, in order to prevent seigneurs and wealthy peasants from manipulating it in their own interests. Following Alfred Cobban, he rightly rejects Saint-Jacob's romantic notions of the village community, displaying a healthy skepticism when he encounters the protests of pauvres laboureurs against the division of common lands: such men were likely to be prosperous peasants whose large herds were best able to profit from existing common grazing rights or common lands. The analyses of the interests at stake in village politics would, however, have been improved if they had been based on the comparison of attendance and votes with tax records, which appear to have been abundant in Burgundy. The antiseigneurialism of the intendants also led them to encourage or tolerate lawsuits which the communautes launched against their seigneurs-lawsuits paid for with the money municipalities made when they followed the intendants' advice and leased out their lands and rights for a profit rather than alienating them. Some mention might have been made here of the role of customary law which, like Roman law in the Midi (where such lawsuits were also common), made it easier to sue because it was accepted that the proof of seigneurial rights was incumbent on the seigneur. Villages rarely won these cases but, says Root, in the process peasants' political consciousness was awakened and turned against the seigneurial regime; this may be so, though there is little sign in the cases he cites of peasants contesting the fundamentals of the seigneurial regime.Behind the intendants' evenhandedness, says Root, was the need to enforce contrainte solidaire, the obligation of the whole community to collect its own direct taxes and produce a guaranteed revenue for the fiscal officials who in turn advanced their own money to the king. The author believes it was a mistake to favor the village community. Not only did this policy raise false hopes for peasants, it also prevented the breakup of commons, the extinction of common grazing rights, and the elimination of the small landowner-necessary preconditions, in Root's view, for an agricultural revolution in France. Root draws the neoliberal economic moral:" The stagnation of agriculture in Burgundy is an example of what happens when fiscal policies determine social and economic development"(p. 218). This argument is largely made on faith and seems a case of looking at policy questions through the wrong end of a telescope. By restricting" government policy" to the actions of the intendants and their subdelegues, Root manages to discern a consistent line, but only at the cost of excluding the work of policymakers like Bertin and Trudaine, who clearly tied their own political fortunes to programs of agricultural modernization on the English model. This, for Root, was only window …