Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks
Detecting Hardware Trojans in PCBs Using Side Channel Loopbacks
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使用侧通道环回检测 PCB 中的硬件木马
DOI：
10.1109/tvlsi.2022.3171174
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Khorrami, Farshad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pearce, Hammond;Surabhi, Virinchi Roy;Krishnamurthy, Prashanth;Trujillo, Joshua;Karri, Ramesh;Khorrami, Farshad
对印刷电路板 (PCB) 的恶意修改称为硬件木马。当 malafide 第三方在制造前或制造后改变 PCB 时，可能会出现这些问题，并且是工业控制系统等安全关键应用中的一个问题。在这项研究中，我们研究了如何利用数据驱动的检测在运行时检测此类木马。我们开发了一个灵活且可重新配置的 PCB 测试台，该测试台源自流行的开源可编程逻辑控制器 (PLC) 平台“OpenPLC”。然后，我们开发了一个特洛伊木马检测框架，该框架利用并分析多模式侧通道（例如定时、磁信号、功率和硬件性能计数器）。我们考虑防御者可配置的输入/输出（I/O）环回测试、与设计文档基线的比较，以及在防御者选择的激励下对系统行为进行磁力计辅助监控。我们的方法可以扩展到无黄金环境。假设 PCB 的黄金（已知良好）版本不可用，但设计信息、数据表和组件级数据可用。我们展示了我们的方法对测试台中实例化的一系列木马的有效性。
Malicious modifications to printed circuit boards (PCBs) are known as hardware Trojans. These may arise when malafide third parties alter PCBs premanufacturing or postmanufacturing and are a concern in safety-critical applications, such as industrial control systems. In this research, we examine how data-driven detection can be utilized to detect such Trojans at run-time. We develop a flexible and reconfigurable PCB test bed derived from the popular open-source programmable logic controller (PLC) platform “OpenPLC.” We then develop a Trojan detection framework, which utilizes and analyzes multimodal side channels (e.g., timing, magnetic signals, power, and hardware performance counters). We consider defender-configurable input/output (I/O) loopback test, comparison with design-document baselines, and magnetometer-aided monitoring of system behavior under defender-chosen excitations. Our approach can extend to golden-free environments. Golden (known-good) versions of the PCBs are assumed not available, but design information, datasheets, and component-level data are available. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on a range of Trojans instantiated in the test bed.