Buyers' Pricing Behavior for Risky Alternatives: Encoding Processes and Preference Reversals
Buyers' Pricing Behavior for Risky Alternatives: Encoding Processes and Preference Reversals
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.40.6.730
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发表时间：
1994-06
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Jeff T. Casey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jeff T. Casey
许多研究都考察了个人的最低销售价格或彩票的确定性等值作为偏好的衡量标准，但很少有研究考察了最高购买价格。由于每笔交易都涉及买方和卖方，因此买方的定价行为本身就很重要。两种基于前景理论的最大购买价格描述模型——整合模型和分离模型——是根据关于认知编码过程的不同假设而发展起来的。使用与激励兼容的现金支付方案对模型进行了实验测试，其中从受试者中得出投注的最高购买价格和投注之间的选择。令人惊讶的是，即使对于获胜概率接近 1.0 的投注，观察到的最高购买价格也远低于预期值。这表明买家受到损失厌恶的强烈影响，并且传统的假设（即风险替代品的购买价格是替代品收益的减少）无法描述行为。相反，受试者似乎主要采用隔离编码过程，其中购买价格与赌注收益分开编码，并被视为确定的损失。然而，这两种编码模型都没有充分解释另一个结果：购买价格的风险厌恶程度低于 3 美元预期价值赌注的风险厌恶程度（产生标准类型 Lichtenstein 和 Slovic 1971 年的偏好逆转），但对 100 美元预期价值赌注的风险厌恶程度更高 - 产生反向偏好逆转 Casey 1991。 1988年进行了讨论。概述了两种理论方法，它们为开发风险下价格判断和选择偏好的统一模型提供了希望。
Numerous studies have examined individuals' minimum selling prices or certainty equivalents for lotteries as measures of preference, but few have examined maximum buying prices. Because every transaction involves a buyer as well as a seller, buyers' pricing behavior is of interest in its own right. Two prospect theory based descriptive models of maximum buying prices-the integration and segregation models-are developed from different assumptions about cognitive encoding processes. The models were tested experimentally using an incentive-compatible cash payoff scheme in which maximum buying prices for bets and choices between bets were elicited from subjects. Surprisingly, observed maximum buying prices were far below expected values even for bets with probabilities of winning near 1.0. This suggests buyers are strongly influenced by loss aversion and that the conventional assumption that the buying price for a risky alternative is a reduction in the alternative's payoffs fails to describe behavior. Instead, it appears subjects predominately employed a segregation encoding process in which the buying price was encoded separately from the bet's payoffs and treated as a sure loss. However, an additional result was not explained adequately by either encoding model: Buying prices were less risk averse than choices for $3 expected value bets-creating preference reversals of the standard kind Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971-but more risk averse for $100 expected value bets-creating reverse preference reversals Casey 1991. Implications for the scale compatibility principle Tversky et al. 1988 are discussed. Two theoretical approaches are outlined which offer promise in the development of a unified model of price judgments and choice preferences under risk.