Exclusive dealing
Exclusive dealing
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DOI：
10.1086/250003
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发表时间：
1998-02-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Whinston, MD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bernheim, BD;Whinston, MD
在本文中，我们提供了一个理解排他性交易现象的概念框架，并探讨了排他性交易使用的动机和影响。对于一大类模型，我们刻画了一种合同博弈的结果，在这种博弈中，制造商可以在他们的合同中使用独家交易条款。然后，我们将这一特征应用于一系列特定的设置。我们证明，排他性合同条款可能是无关紧要的、反竞争的，或者是提高效率的，这取决于背景。更具体地说，我们展示了在非重合市场(即，除了实行排他性交易的市场)中潜在的反竞争效应，并探索了在共同表示引起激励冲突的背景下提高效率的潜力。在每一种情况下，我们都描述了禁止排他性交易会以何种方式改变均衡结果。我们证明，禁令可能会产生令人惊讶的微妙和意想不到的影响。
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending on the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in noncoincident markets (i.e., markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting in which common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.