Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard

Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard
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存在道德风险的机制设计

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3036323
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
Social Science Research Network
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Suehyun Kwon
Suehyun Kwon
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Suehyun Kwon

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本文讨论了动态机构设计中通常意义上的一级偏差集成电路约束在什么情况下是充分的。当它们不充分时,人们可以很容易地构造例子。如果当前状态或信念不是agent私有历史的足够的汇总统计,那么一般来说,单阶段偏差IC约束是不够的。本文给出了通常意义上的充分条件;在通常意义上的一级偏差集成电路约束不充分的情况下,给出了所有集成电路约束的充分必要条件。
This paper characterizes when the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense of dynamic mechanism design are sufficient. One can easily construct examples of when they are not sufficient. If the current state or the belief is not a sufficient summary statics of the agent’s private history, the one-stage deviation IC constraints are not sufficient in general. The paper provides sufficient conditions for when they are sufficient in the usual sense; it also provides a necessary and sufficient condition for all IC constraints if the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense are not sufficient.