Comparing UCT versus CFR in Simultaneous Games
Comparing UCT versus CFR in Simultaneous Games
复制标题
同步比赛中 UCT 与 CFR 的比较
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Schaeffer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mohammad Shafiei;Nathan R Sturtevant;J. Schaeffer
同时移动游戏，所有玩家都必须同时采取行动是一般游戏中的一类游戏。在本文中，我们分析了UCT在此类游戏中的表现。我们认为，UCT一般不会收敛到NASH平衡，并且可以利用其收敛的情况。我们还分析了CFR（反事实遗憾），并展示如何使用它来利用UCT。
Simultaneous move games where all the player have to take their actions simultaneously are a class of games in general game playing. In this paper we analyze how UCT performs in this class of games. We argue that UCT does not converge to a Nash equilibrium in general and the situation that it converges to can be exploited. We also analyze CFR (CounterFactual Regret) and show how it can be used to exploit UCT.