Experimental identification of asymmetric information: Evidence on crop insurance in the Philippines
Experimental identification of asymmetric information: Evidence on crop insurance in the Philippines
复制标题
不对称信息的实验识别：菲律宾农作物保险的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Snaebjorn Gunnsteinsson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Snaebjorn Gunnsteinsson
摘要采用两水平随机田间试验和激励偏好诱导研究菲律宾作物保险信息不对称问题。在这首个关于非健康保险中道德风险的实验研究中，在对保险提供者高度信任的农民中，随机投保地块的可预防损失翻了一番。农民更喜欢在有洪水和作物病害风险的地块上投保，这是典型的逆向选择，而在离家较远的地块上投保，这是对预期道德风险行为的选择，结果是在首选地块上的赔付高出72%。克服这些挑战需要利用新技术。
Abstract I study asymmetric information in crop insurance in the Philippines using a two-level randomized field experiment and incentivized preference elicitation. In this first experimental study of moral hazard in non-health insurance, preventable damages double on randomly insured plots among farmers with high trust in the insurance provider. Farmers prefer insurance on plots that are at risk of floods and crop diseases, a sign of classic adverse selection, and plots that are far away from home, a sign of selection on anticipated moral hazard behavior, resulting in 72% higher payouts on preferred plots. Overcoming these challenges requires leveraging new technologies.