Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
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证据成本适中的机制设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jesse Bull
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jesse Bull
本文讨论了如何将适度的证据披露成本纳入机制设计分析。本文表明，在效用可转移的公共行动环境中，人们可以将注意力限制在一类三阶段动态机制上。在具有两个或多个参与者的完全信息情况下，这种类型的机制的一个版本可以用来消除均衡中的证据生产。本文还给出了Bull and Watson(2004)所研究的一类机制与本文所考虑的机制等价的证据环境的条件。
This paper addresses how a moderate evidence disclosure cost can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. The paper shows that in public-action settings with transferable utility one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms. Under complete information with two or more players, a version of this type of mechanism can be used to eliminate evidence production in equilibrium. The paper also provides conditions on the evidence environment under which the class of mechanisms studied in Bull and Watson (2004) is equivalent to those considered here.