"Free will": are we all equal? A dynamical perspective of the conscious intention to move.
"Free will": are we all equal? A dynamical perspective of the conscious intention to move.
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DOI：
10.1093/nc/niv009
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Cleeremans A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Caspar EA;Cleeremans A
在1983年的开创性研究中，利贝特和他的同事们提出，对一个人行动意图的意识具有一种后知的特征，因为它发生在导致行动的大脑活动开始很久之后。关键是，Libet et al.进一步提出，行为意图的意识体验与行为本身之间的时间窗口（±200 ms）为人们提供了“否决”展开的行为的可能性。这就提出了一个问题，是否有个体差异的持续时间，这个“否决窗口”，哪些组件的准备潜力（RP）和偏侧准备潜力（LRP）解释这种变异性。据报道，一些精神疾病导致有意识的意图和行动之间的时间间隔缩短。然而，目前尚不清楚这些患者是否患有意志感受损，因此将自愿运动视为非自愿运动，或者是否自愿抑制行为实际上减少了，因为有意识的意图发生得更晚。我们在本论文中有两个目的。首先，我们旨在通过检查否决窗口的持续时间与冲动之间的关系来澄清意识在自愿行动中的作用。其次，我们试图检查RP和LRP波形的不同组成部分，以试图解释观察到的W判断的变化。我们的研究结果表明：（1）冲动的人比非冲动的人在他们的意图和行动之间表现出更短的延迟，（2）这种差异很难归因于时间感知的差异。脑电图表明，RP的增长速度与解释W判断的差异有关，因为我们观察到，在有意识的意图的时刻，晚意识意图的人的RP低于早意识意图的人。这些波形的起始和截距不太容易解释。这些结果为意识在自愿行为中所起的作用提供了新的视角。
In their seminal (1983) study, Libet and colleagues suggested that awareness of one’s intention to act has a postdictive character in that it occurs long after cerebral activity leading to action has been initiated. Crucially, Libet et al. further suggested that the time window (±200 ms) between the conscious experience of the intention to act and the action itself offers people the possibility of “vetoing” the unfolding action. This raises the question of whether there are individual differences in the duration of this “veto window” and which components of the readiness potential (RP) and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) explain this variability. It has been reported that some psychiatric diseases lead to shorter intervals between conscious intentions and actions. However, it is unclear whether such patients suffer from impairment of the sense of volition, thus experiencing voluntary movements as involuntary, or whether voluntary inhibition of action is actually reduced, since conscious intention occurs later. We had two aims in the present paper. First, we aimed at clarifying the role of consciousness in voluntary actions by examining the relation between the duration of the veto window and impulsivity. Second, we sought to examine different components of the RP and LRP waveforms so as to attempt to explain observed variability in W judgments. Our results indicate (1) that impulsive people exhibit a shorter delay between their intention and the action than non-impulsive people, and (2) that this difference can hardly be attributed to a difference in time perception. Electroencephalography indicated that the rate of growth of the RP is relevant to explain differences in W judgments, since we observed that the RP at the moment of conscious intention is lower for people with late conscious intention than for people with early conscious intention. The onset and the intercept of these waveforms were less interpretable. These results bring new light on the role that consciousness plays in voluntary action.