EXTERNALITIES AND COMPULSORY VACCINATIONS
EXTERNALITIES AND COMPULSORY VACCINATIONS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(91)90048-7
复制
发表时间：
1991-06-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
INTRILIGATOR, MD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BRITO, DL;SHESHINSKI, E;INTRILIGATOR, MD
本文挑战传统的智慧，因为搭便车的问题，一个案例，可以强制接种预防传染病。对于一类非常普遍的模型来说，要求所有人接种疫苗严格取决于自由选择。市场分配不是最优的，在完全信息最优的情况下，一些个体将被迫接种疫苗。这种分配可以通过税收和补贴来实现;然而，政府可以利用疫苗接种的启示属性，实现比完全信息最优更好的分配。
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that, because of the free rider problem, a case can be made for compulsary vaccination against infectious disease. For a very general class of models, requiring that all individuals be vaccinated is strictly dominated by free choice. The market allocation is not optimum and in the full information optimum some individuals would be compelled to be vaccinated. This allocation can be achieved by taxes and subsidies; however, the government can exploit the revelation properties of vaccination and achieve an even better allocation than the full information optimum.