Cross-Hauling Direct Foreign Investment and Unionized Oligopoly
Cross-Hauling Direct Foreign Investment and Unionized Oligopoly
复制标题
交叉运输直接外国投资和联盟寡头垄断
DOI：
10.1016/0014-2921(94)00038-2
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Lex Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lex Zhao
本文构建了一个工会化双寡头垄断下的产业内交叉DFI局部均衡模型，其中工资和就业是通过企业与国家工会之间的纳什讨价还价来确定的。我们发现，在对称下，交叉牵引DFI是唯一的纳什均衡，其中谈判的工资下降的每一个就业水平和每个公司的利润增加。如果工会是以工资（就业）为导向的，交叉运输DFI会增加（减少）就业和国家福利。
We construct a partial equilibrium model of intra-industry cross-hauling DFI with unionized duopoly, where wages and employment are determined through Nash bargaining between firms and national labor unions. We show that under symmetry, cross-hauling DFI is the unique Nash equilibrium, in which the negotiated wage decreases for every level of employment and each firm's profit increases. Cross-hauling DFI increases (decreases) employment and national welfare if the union is wage (employment) oriented.