Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making
Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making
复制标题
多重委托人和官僚政策制定的监督
DOI：
10.1177/0951629808100762
复制
发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Sean Gailmard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sean Gailmard
我研究了一个模型，在该模型中，多个立法负责人监督一个官僚机构的执行一个项目。每个主体都可以执行对实现的监督，以限制代理利用的信息不对称。执行监督的成本很高，并且由于主体之间的信息泄漏，一个主体的监督将信息泄露给所有主体。因此，对于审计成本的某些值，在委托人之间的监督中存在集体行动问题：委托人的多重性可能导致这种形式的监督水平相对于委托人的共同利益而言表现不佳。值得注意的是，尽管委托人对代理人的行为有共同的利益，但委托人的多重性减少了他们对代理人的集体控制，即当有多个委托人时，不需要对代理人行为的偏好冲突来削弱问责制。总的来说，结果指出，监督机构的体制结构对问责制有重要影响，独立于被监督者的体制结构。
I examine a model in which multiple legislative principals monitor a bureaucratic agent's implementation of a project. The principals can each perform oversight of the implementation to limit information asymmetries exploited by the agent. Oversight is costly to perform and due to information leakages between principals, oversight by one principal reveals information to all principals. Thus for some values of the audit costs, there is a collective action problem in monitoring among the principals: the multiplicity of principals can cause the level of this form of oversight to be underperformed relative to the principals' joint interests. Notably, the multiplicity of principals reduces their collective control over the agent even though they have common interests about the agent's actions, i.e. conflicting preference about agent actions are not necessary to attenuate accountability when there are multiple principals. Overall the results point out that the institutional structure of the overseeing body has an important effect on accountability, independent of the institutional structure of the overseen.