The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing-Constrained Economy
The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing-Constrained Economy
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DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12030
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发表时间：
2013-06
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Ryo Arawatari;Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ryo Arawatari;Tetsuo Ono
本文介绍了具有借贷约束的三收入阶层、代际重叠模型。用于资助现收现付社会保障的劳动所得税是由历代人玩的多数投票游戏决定的。当消费利率弹性较低时，政治均衡的特征可能是老年人和中等收入年轻人结成联盟，赞成提高税率和增加社会保障，而低收入和高收入年轻人则赞成降低税率和减少社会保障。在这种均衡中，如果决定性选民受到借贷限制，那么社会保障的规模就会因决定性选民工资的均值保值减少而减少。
This paper introduces a three-income class, overlapping-generations model with borrowing constraints. The labor income tax for financing pay-as-you-go social security is determined in a majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. When the interest-rate elasticity of consumption is low, the political equilibrium might be characterized by an equilibrium where the old and the middle-income young individuals form a coalition in favor of a higher tax rate and greater social security, while the low- and the high-income young individuals favor a lower tax rate and less social security. In this equilibrium, the size of social security is decreased by the mean-preserving reduction of a decisive voter's wage if he/she is borrowing-constrained.