Market-Based Resource Allocation for Content Delivery in the Internet
Market-Based Resource Allocation for Content Delivery in the Internet
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/tc.2003.1252853
复制
发表时间：
2003-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Özgür Erçetin;L. Tassiulas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Özgür Erçetin;L. Tassiulas
缓存已被广泛用于存储最流行/最近请求的数据，以改善用户延迟并减少网络负载。最近，在内容分发网络（CDN）的框架内开发了一种更系统的缓存方法。CDN是缓存网络，其中缓存在地理上分布并代表订阅者网站服务用户请求。用户从缓存服务器接收所请求的信息，缓存服务器离用户更近，通常比原始服务器的负载小得多。其目标是通过智能地分发内容并从最有效的站点服务于用户请求来最大限度地减少用户延迟。我们现实的模型中的代理CDN自私的自我最大化的行为，并定义为一个非合作博弈的问题。我们分离的分布和路由子问题，并使用游戏来解决每一个。我们表明，子问题的平衡解决方案，如果一个子问题的平衡是唯一的，我们实现了该子问题的全局最优解。我们还确定，如果内容提供商不愿意支付高金额和该高速缓存大小足够小，则达到唯一的平衡。我们注意到，全球系统最佳要求内容提供商支付非常高的金额，这在实践中可能会禁止分布式方法的适用性。因此，我们考虑的内容提供商的投资策略，最大限度地提高出版商的净利益，并导致一个接近最佳的系统解决方案。我们还表明，联合分销和路由游戏有一个均衡，并证明其性能的数值例子。
Caches have been used extensively to store the most popular/recent requested data to improve the user latency and reduce the network load. Recently, a more systematic approach to caching has been developed within the framework of content delivery networks (CDN). A CDN is the network of caches, where the caches are geographically distributed and serve user requests on behalf of the subscriber Web sites. Users receive the requested information from the caching servers, which are closer to the users and usually much less loaded than the origin server. The objective is to minimize the user latency by intelligently distributing the content and serving the user requests from the most efficient sites. We realistically model the agents in a CDN with selfish self-maximizing behaviors and define the problem as a noncooperative game. We separate the distribution and routing subproblems and use games to solve each. We show that the subproblems have equilibrium solutions and, if the equilibrium of a subproblem is unique, we achieve the global optimum for that subproblem. We also determine that a unique equilibrium is reached if the content providers are not willing to pay high amounts and the cache sizes are sufficiently small. We noticed that the global system optimum requires the content providers to pay very high amounts, which in practice may prohibit the applicability of the distributed method. Thus, we consider an Investment strategy for the content providers, which maximizes the publishers' net benefits and leads to a near-optimum system solution. We also show that the joint distribution and routing game has an equilibrium and demonstrate its performance by numerical examples.