What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization

What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization
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贸易谈判者谈判什么?

DOI:
10.1257/aer.101.4.1238
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发表时间:
2006
期刊:
New Institutional Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Staiger
R. Staiger
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. Bagwell;R. Staiger

文献摘要

被引文献

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贸易谈判者谈判的内容是什么?经济学文献中有两种截然不同的理论方法为这个问题提供了答案:贸易条件理论和承诺理论。贸易条件理论认为,贸易协议对政府是有用的,因为它是帮助政府摆脱贸易条件驱动的囚徒困境的一种手段。承诺理论认为,贸易协定对政府是有用的,因为它是帮助政府向私营部门做出承诺的一种手段。这些理论并不是相互排斥的,但几乎没有直接证据表明这两种理论的经验相关性。我们试图对世界贸易组织谈判的市场准入承诺所达到的目的进行实证调查。我们在数据中找到了对贸易条件理论的广泛支持。我们更试探性地声称,在数据中也找到了对承诺理论的支持。
What do trade negotiators negotiate about? There are two distinct theoretical approaches in the economics literature that offer an answer to this question: the terms-of-trade theory and the commitment theory. The terms-of-trade theory holds that trade agreements are useful to governments as a means of helping them escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. The commitment theory holds that trade agreements are useful to governments as a means of helping them make commitments to the private sector. These theories are not mutually exclusive, but there is little direct evidence on the empirical relevance of either. We attempt to investigate empirically the purpose served by market access commitments negotiated in the World Trade Organization. We find broad support for the terms-of-trade theory in the data. We claim more tentatively to find support in the data for the commitment theory as well.