Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries
Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries
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DOI：
10.1086/298189
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发表时间：
1988-07
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
C. Davidson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Davidson
一个模型的工资决定在工会寡头垄断行业的发展和使用两种不同的谈判结构下的集体谈判的结果进行比较，一个是在每个公司的工人是由单独的和独立的工会（本地谈判）和一个全国性的工会代表所有工人在该行业。在这两种情况下，讨价还价的问题有一个独特的结果与行业范围内的讨价还价，导致更高的工资。此外，全行业的工会本质上是稳定的，因为独立工会没有动机试图在串通协议上作弊。
A model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures-one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions (local bargaining) and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry. In both cases, the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages. In addition, industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement.