On competition between wireless service providers
On competition between wireless service providers
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论无线服务提供商之间的竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Wenyi Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Feng Zhang;Wenyi Zhang
近年来，电信网络定价受到了广泛关注，因为巨大的商业利益推动了从垄断网络向有竞争服务提供商的商业网络的转变。本文考虑了一个由两个无线接入点覆盖的通信市场中的定价博弈，并分析了两种商业模式：垄断（两个接入点由一个服务提供商控制）和双头垄断（两个接入点由不同的服务提供商控制）。我们在温和条件下证明了两种情况下纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性，并推导出了它们的解析表达式。为了比较垄断和双头垄断对社会福利和服务提供商利润的影响，我们定义了两个指标来量化这种影响：PoCS（竞争对社会福利的价格），即垄断的社会福利与双头垄断的社会福利之比；PoCP（竞争对利润的价格），即垄断的利润与双头垄断的总利润之比。我们证明，对于对称交叉干扰，PoCS的紧下界是3/4，PoCP的紧下界是1；另一方面，PoCS和PoCP都无上界。
Pricing in telecommunication networks has received much attention in recent years, as the huge commercial interest drives the transition from a monopolistic network to a commercial one with competitive service providers (SPs). The present paper considers a pricing game in a communication market covered by two wireless access points (APs) and analyzes two commercial models: monopoly (two APs controlled by one SP) and duopoly (two APs controlled by different SPs). We prove, under mild conditions, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for both cases and derive their analytical expressions. In order to compare the impact of monopoly and duopoly on social welfare and SPs profits, we define two metrics to quantify such impacts: PoCS (price of competition on social welfare) which is the ratio of social welfare of monopoly to that of duopoly, and PoCP (price of competition on profits) which is the ratio of profit of monopoly to the sum profit of duopoly. We prove that for symmetric cross interference, the tight lower bound of PoCS is 3/4, and that of PoCP is 1; on the other hand, both PoCS and PoCP are unbounded from above.