Believing Conjunctions
Believing Conjunctions
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作者：
Simon J. Evnine
我将在这篇论文中论证它应该如此。[1]开始，我将为（CP）辩护，反对对它提出的几种批评，这些批评分为两类，我将分别称之为内部的和外部的。内部的反对意见是，一个包含（CP）的理论未能说明什么是合理的，相信它自己的标准是令人满意的。特别是，由于几乎每个人都同意，在一个矛盾的信念是不合理的，（CP）是批评的理由，它将意味着，在某些矛盾的信念是合理的。外部的反对意见认为，包含（CP）的理论中的理想化程度是如此之大，以至于它与理性信念理论应该与之相关的各种现实世界现象无关。2
I shall argue in this paper that it should. 1 To begin with, I shall defend (CP) against several criticisms that have been launched against it. These criticisms are of two kinds, which I shall call internal and external respectively. Internal objections are that a theory that includes (CP) fails to give an account of what it is rational to believe that is satisfactory by its own standards. In particular, since almost everyone agrees that belief in a contradiction is not rational, (CP) is criticized on the grounds that it would imply that beliefs in some contradictions are rational. External objections maintain that the degree of idealization in a theory including (CP) is so great as to make it irrelevant to various real-world phenomena to which a theory of rational belief should be relevant. 2