Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions
Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions
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DOI：
10.1257/mic.20130254
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发表时间：
2016-05-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Decarolis, Francesco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Conley, Timothy G.;Decarolis, Francesco
我们研究采购拍卖中的进入和投标，其中合同授予最接近调整后的平均投标的投标。这些拍卖在公共采购中很常见，它们会激励协调投标以操纵投标分配。我们提供统计测试来检测协调的进入和投标选择。这些测试在验证数据集中表现良好，在该数据集中，法院案件可以观察到协调。我们使用这些测试来检测较大数据集中可疑但未知的协调。结果用于解释转向首价拍卖后的重大市场震荡。
We study entry and bidding in procurement auctions where contracts are awarded to the bid closest to a trimmed average bid. These auctions, common in public procurement, create incentives to coordinate bids to manipulate the bid distribution. We present statistical tests to detect coordinated entry and bidding choices. The tests perform well in a validation dataset where a court case makes coordination observable. We use the tests to detect coordination in a larger dataset where it is suspected, but not known. The results are used to interpret a major market shakeout following a switch to first price auctions.