Reconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory of Political Obligation*
Reconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory of Political Obligation*
复制标题
重新思考政治义务的“实际契约”理论*
DOI：
10.1086/233895
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
10.8
通讯作者：
Margaret Gilbert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Margaret Gilbert
人们是否因为某个国家是他们的国家而负有义务？实际契约理论认为，他们这样做是因为他们同意以某种方式行事。当代哲学家通常用“没有达成一致”的反对意见和“不具有道德约束力”的反对意见来反对。我认为“不具有道德约束力”的反对意见并不是结论性的。至于“不同意”的反对意见，虽然实际契约理论屈服了，但密切相关的政治义务多元主体理论却没有屈服。多元主体理论可能是实际契约理论的真理，应该对其进行探索。
Do people have obligations by virtue of the fact that a given country is their country? Actual contract theory says they do because they have agreed to act in certain ways. Contemporary philosophers standardly object in terms of the 'no agreement' objection and the 'not morally binding' objection. I argue that the 'not morally binding' objection is not conclusive. As for the 'no agreement' objection, though actual contract theory succumbs, a closely related plural subject theory of political obligation does not. Plural subject theory may be the truth in actual contract theory and should be explored in its stead.