Direct-marketing, indirect profits: A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design
Direct-marketing, indirect profits: A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.49.1.1.12749
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发表时间：
2003-01-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Hess, JD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chiang, WYK;Chhajed, D;Hess, JD
电子商务的出现促使许多制造商重新设计其传统的渠道结构，从事直销。该模型概念化了客户接受直接渠道的影响，即客户接受直接渠道作为替代品的程度。在供应链设计的传统商店购物。客户对直接渠道的接受程度可能足够强，以至于独立制造商愿意开设直接渠道，与自己的零售商竞争。在这里，直接营销被用于战略渠道控制的目的，尽管它本身是低效的，令人惊讶的是，它可以使制造商获利，即使直接销售发生。具体来说，我们构建了一个制造商和独立零售商之间的价格设定博弈。直接营销通过零售渠道间接增加了利润的流动，通过降低低效率的价格双重边缘化程度，帮助制造商提高整体盈利能力。虽然制造商通过直接渠道来限制零售商的定价行为，但直接渠道可能——并不总是对零售商有害，因为它会伴随着批发价格的降低。制造商拉动和推动的这种结合可以使零售商在平衡中受益。最后，我们证明，即使采用其他商业实践获得价格效率，仅仅是引入直接渠道的威胁也可以增加制造商在合作利润中的谈判份额。
The advent of e-commerce has prompted many-manufacturers to redesign their traditional channel structures by engaging in direct sales. The model conceptualizes the impact-of customer acceptance of a direct channel, the degree to which customers accept a direct channel as a substitute for. shopping at a traditional store, on supply-chain design. The customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an indepent manufacturer Would open a direct channel to, compete with its own retailers. Here, direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though it is inefficient on its own and, surprisingly, it can profit the manufacturer even when so direct sales occur. Specifically, we construct a price-setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer. Direct marketing, which indirectly increases the flow of profits through the retail channel, helps the manufacturer improve overall Profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization. While operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer's pricing behavior, the direct channel may-not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction. This combination of manufacturer pull and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the mere threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer's negotiated share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other business practices.