Electoral Rules and Corruption
Electoral Rules and Corruption
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选举规则与腐败
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Francesco Trebbi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Persson;G. Tabellini;Francesco Trebbi
腐败是否与选举规则有系统的联系？最近的理论研究给出了肯定的答案。但对数据知之甚少。我们试图通过将腐败与20世纪90年代约80个民主国家的选举制度的不同特征联系起来来解决这一空白。我们利用数据的跨国变化，以及最近的选举改革事件所产生的时间变化。证据与理论上的先验一致。较大的选区-从而较低的进入门槛-与较少的腐败有关，而较大比例的从政党名单中当选的候选人-从而较低的个人问责制-与较多的腐败有关。在多数规则的选举中，个人问责似乎与个人选票联系最紧密，尽管公开的政党名单似乎也有一定的影响。因为不同的方面大致上是相互抵消的，从严格比例选举到严格多数选举的转变对腐败只有很小的负面影响。(JEL：E62、H3）
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? Recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer. But little is known about the data. We try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s. We exploit the cross-country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors. Larger voting districts— and thus lower barriers to entry— are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists— and thus less individual accountability— are associated with more corruption. Individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality-rule elections, even though open party lists also seem to have some effect. Because different aspects roughly offset each other, a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption. (JEL: E62, H3)