Signaling Games - Dynamics of Evolution and Learning

Signaling Games - Dynamics of Evolution and Learning
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信号游戏 - 进化和学习的动力学

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_8
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发表时间:
2011
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Kevin J. S. Zollman
Kevin J. S. Zollman
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Simon M. Huttegger;Kevin J. S. Zollman

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“我们下去,在那里变乱他们的言语,使他们彼此不通”(创世记11:1)。这篇文章中描述的语言混乱状态可以理解为一种最大的异质性状态:在一个群体中,每种可能的语言都存在。然而,它也可以被视为一种同质状态;据推测,每一种可能的语言都有极少数人使用,从而导致语言集合的均匀分布。我们应该期望个体保持这种对称状态吗?或者他们会同意使用一种语言,从而打破最初混淆的对称性(Skyrms, 1996)?这些问题是语言起源的基本问题。当个体之间的交流不能达到足够高的程度时,他们如何决定信号约定?在哲学文献中,这些问题是由奎因(1936)提出的,尽管它们在奎因之前已经被考虑过了。类似的问题也激发了语言学(斯蒂尔斯,2001;Jäger and van Rooij, 2007)和生物学(如微生物水平的交流或动物信号)的兴趣。
“Let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech”(Genesis 11: 1). The state of language confusion described in this passage may be understood as a state of maximal heterogeneity: every possible language is present in a population. It may also be viewed as a state of homogeneity, however; presumably, each possible language is spoken by a very small number of persons, inducingauniform distribution over the set of languages. Should we expect individuals to stay at such a symmetric state? Or will they rather agree on one language, thereby breaking the symmetry of initial confusion (Skyrms, 1996)?These questions are basic for the origin of language. When individuals cannot communicate to a sufficiently high degree, how can they decide on signaling conventions? In the philosophical literature, such problems were formulated by Quine (1936), although they have already been considered before Quine. Similar questions have also sparkled interest in linguistics (Steels, 2001; Jäger and van Rooij, 2007) and in biology (eg communication at the microbiological level or animal signals).
书评,“女性”作为“母亲”是由儿童保育构成的 - 嘉康利,“受过教育的母亲,结构化游戏(1998)”
DOI: --
发表时间: 2008
期刊: <育児>を契機とするクロスオーバー、JSGS-Net若手研究者と育児ワーキンググループ・レポート 1
影响因子: --
作者:
TORTYAMA;Junko;鳥山 純子
通讯作者: 鳥山 純子