Signaling Games - Dynamics of Evolution and Learning
Signaling Games - Dynamics of Evolution and Learning
复制标题
信号游戏 - 进化和学习的动力学
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_8
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发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Kevin J. S. Zollman
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Simon M. Huttegger;Kevin J. S. Zollman
“Let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech”(Genesis 11: 1). The state of language confusion described in this passage may be understood as a state of maximal heterogeneity: every possible language is present in a population. It may also be viewed as a state of homogeneity, however; presumably, each possible language is spoken by a very small number of persons, inducingauniform distribution over the set of languages. Should we expect individuals to stay at such a symmetric state? Or will they rather agree on one language, thereby breaking the symmetry of initial confusion (Skyrms, 1996)?These questions are basic for the origin of language. When individuals cannot communicate to a sufficiently high degree, how can they decide on signaling conventions? In the philosophical literature, such problems were formulated by Quine (1936), although they have already been considered before Quine. Similar questions have also sparkled interest in linguistics (Steels, 2001; Jäger and van Rooij, 2007) and in biology (eg communication at the microbiological level or animal signals).
DOI:
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发表时间:
2008
期刊:
<育児>を契機とするクロスオーバー、JSGS-Net若手研究者と育児ワーキンググループ・レポート 1
影响因子:
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作者:
TORTYAMA;Junko;鳥山 純子
通讯作者:
鳥山 純子