Russell's Theories of Judgement
Russell's Theories of Judgement
复制标题
罗素的判断理论
DOI：
10.1080/09608788.2019.1604315
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Ryo Ito
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yusuke Hayashi;Bingzhi Wu;Tsukasa Hirashima;Ryo Ito
这篇论文试图解释为什么罗素抛弃了命题的本体论，命题是独立于头脑的复杂实体，可能是判断的对象。我认为，他这样做并不是因为任何决定性的论点，而是因为他发现更好地支持对真理的存在论，根据这一说法，当且仅当存在(或在他看来存在)相应的事实时，判断才是正确的。为了支持这一说法，他在采用多重关系判断理论之前，考察了各种判断理论，这是他当时支持该理论的最可行的方式。我还试图解释为什么他更喜欢对真理的存在主义描述。
This paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse theexistentialaccount of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a correspondingfact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.