The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
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发表时间：
2005-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela
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文献类型：
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作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela
我们研究的是两边都有有限数量的代理的双边市场，并且两边都有不完全的信息。代理是基于昂贵的信号进行分类匹配的。主要目标是确定由于分类匹配（相对于随机匹配）而导致的预期产出的潜在增加完全被信号成本抵消的条件。我们还研究了当我们改变代理的数量及其属性的分布时，市场双方的信号活动和福利是如何变化的，从而显示了小市场特有的影响。最后，我们看一下双边市场模型的连续版本，并建立与有限版本的联系。从技术上讲，本文是基于R. Barlow和F. Proschan（1966,1975）在可靠性理论框架中提出的关于（规范化）间隔的随机排序和单调故障率分布的有序统计量的其他线性组合的非常优雅的理论。
We study two-sided markets with a finite numbers of agents on each side, and with two-sided incomplete information. Agents are matched assortatively on the basis of costly signals. A main goal is to identify conditions under which the potential increase in expected output due to assortative matching (relative to random matching) is completely offset by the costs of signalling. We also study how the signalling activity and welfare on each side of the market change when we vary the number of agents and the distribution of their attributes, thereby displaying effects that are particular to small markets. Finally, we look at the continuous version of our two-sided market model and establish the connections to the finite version. Technically, the paper is based on the very elegant theory about stochastic ordering of (normalized) spacings and other linear combinations of order statistics from distributions with monotone failure rates, pioneered by R. Barlow and F. Proschan (1966, 1975) in the framework of reliability theory.