ASNI: Attenuated Signature Noise Injection for Low-Overhead Power Side-Channel Attack Immunity
ASNI: Attenuated Signature Noise Injection for Low-Overhead Power Side-Channel Attack Immunity
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DOI：
10.1109/tcsi.2018.2819499
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发表时间：
2018-10-01
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Sen, Shreyas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Das, Debayan;Maity, Shovan;Sen, Shreyas
在物理平台上实现的计算安全的密码算法通过其电源泄漏重要的“侧信道”信息。相关功率攻击是一种有效的功率侧信道攻击（SCA）技术，它通过分析估计的和测量的电源电流迹线之间的统计相关性来提取秘密密钥。现有的功率SCA对策主要基于降低泄漏信息的SNR、功率平衡或门级掩蔽，其中每一个都引入显著的功率、面积或性能开销，这需要有效的通用对策。本文介绍了ASNI：衰减签名噪声注入，这是一种节能的通用对策，并显示SCA抵抗AES-128加密作为一个应用程序。ASNI使用分流低压差（LDO）稳压器，将电源电流迹线中的AES电流特征抑制> 200倍。该并联LDO已在130非CMOS工艺中制作并验证。ASNI的系统级实现（AES-128内核工作在40 MHz）表明，即使经过1 M次重复测试，系统仍保持安全，与单独添加噪声相比，功耗降低了约25倍。
Computationally-secure cryptographic algorithms implemented on a physical platform leak significant "side-channel" information through their power supplies. Correlational power attack is an efficient power side-channel attack (SCA) technique, which analyzes the statistical correlation between the estimated and the measured supply current traces to extract the secret key. The existing power SCA countermeasures are mainly based on reducing the SNR of the leaked information, power balancing, or gate-level masking, each of which introduces significant power, area or performance overheads, which calls for an efficient generic countermeasure. This paper presents ASNI: Attenuated Signature Noise Injection, which is an energy efficient generic countermeasure, and shows SCA resistance on the AES-128 encryption as an application. ASNI uses a shunt lowdrop-out (LDO) regulator to suppress the AES current signature by >200x in the supply current traces. The shunt LDO has been fabricated and validated in 130 non CMOS technology. System-level implementation of the ASNI, with the AES-128 core operating at 40 MHz, shows that the system remains secure even after 1 M encryptions, with similar to 25x reduction in power overhead compared to that of noise addition alone.