International Trade Rules and Environmental Cooperation under Asymmetric Information
International Trade Rules and Environmental Cooperation under Asymmetric Information
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信息不对称下的国际贸易规则与环境合作
DOI：
10.2307/2527283
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
I. Wooton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rodney D. Ludema;I. Wooton
由于直接环境政策的当地成本相对于国际利益的信息不对称，各国将过度依赖贸易政策来控制谈判协议中的跨境外部性。出口商在谈判前选择的单边外部性政策提供了一个关于其当地成本的信号，修改了谈判中使用的信息。出口商将外部性税作为次优贸易工具的动机越强，信号就越好。因此，在缺乏环境合作的情况下，对单方面使用贸易政策施加外部限制，可以减少信息问题，改善未来环境协定的绩效。1997年由宾夕法尼亚大学经济系和大坂大学社会经济研究协会版权所有。
With asymmetric information about local costs relative to international benefits of direct environmental policy, countries will rely too heavily on trade policy in controlling cross-border externalities in negotiated agreements. The unilateral externality policy chosen before negotiations by an exporter provides a signal about its local cost, modifying the information used in negotiations. The greater the exporter's incentive to use an externality tax as a second-best trade instrument, the better the signal. Consequently, exogenous limits on the unilateral use of trade policy in the absence of environmental cooperation can diminish the informational problem and improve the performance of prospective environmental agreements. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.