FAIR ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND CRITERIA OF JUSTICE
FAIR ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE GOODS AND CRITERIA OF JUSTICE
复制标题
DOI：
10.2307/2938172
复制
发表时间：
1991-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
GALE, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
ALKAN, A;DEMANGE, G;GALE, D
一组n个物品和M个钱要分配给m个人。 例如：对象是任务，金钱是固定预算中的补偿。 通过约束优化的一个基本参数表明，对于M足够大的有效，嫉妒自由分配的集合是非空的，并具有良好的结构。 特别地，不同的公平标准导致唯一的最佳公平分配，其对于M的变化表现良好。 这与通常的关于可分货物的公平分配理论形成鲜明对比。
A set of n objects and an amount M of money is to be distributed among m people. Example: the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget. An elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for M sufficiently large the set of efficient, envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure. In particular, various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations which are well behaved with respect to changes of M. This is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods.