Preemptive competition between two firms with different discount rates
Preemptive competition between two firms with different discount rates
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DOI：
10.1002/mde.3264
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发表时间：
2020-11
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
M. Nishihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Nishihara
本文研究了具有不同时间贴现率的两家企业之间的实物期权双寡头博弈。我推导了均衡状态下的投资顺序、投资门槛和企业价值。由于没有成本劣势，有耐心的企业比没有耐心的对手更早进入市场并获得更多价值。当耐心企业具有成本劣势时，市场进入的顺序取决于市场特征。在先发优势较弱、市场波动较大、市场增长率较低的情况下，缺乏耐心的企业更有可能成为先发企业。值得注意的是，有耐心的企业比没有耐心的企业赚得更多，即使有耐心的企业进入市场较晚。这些结果与市场进入时机的实证研究结果一致。JEL分类代码：C73；G31;L13。
This paper studies a real options duopoly game between two firms with different time discount rates. I derive the order of investments, investment thresholds, and firm values in equilibrium. With no cost disadvantage, the patient firm enters the market earlier and gains more value than does the impatient opponent. When the patient firm has a cost disadvantage, the order of market entry can depend on the market characteristics. With a weaker first-mover advantage, higher market volatility, and lower market growth rate, the impatient firm is more likely to be the first mover. Notably, the patient firm can earn more than the impatient firm, even though the patient firm enters the market later. These results are consistent with empirical findings on market entry timing. JEL Classifications Code: C73; G31; L13.