Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma
Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma
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DOI：
10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00118-9
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发表时间：
2000-10-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Kirchkamp, O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kirchkamp, O
我们将进化的思想应用于空间模型。囚徒困境或协调游戏在社区内反复进行，参与者不会优化，而是模仿成功的策略。引入了玩家的区别行为，将策略表示为小自动机，可以对不同的邻居处于不同的状态。大量的模拟表明，即使在随机环境中，合作也是持续的，在2x2协调博弈中，参与者并不总是在风险主导均衡上进行协调，生存策略之间的成功可能会有所不同。我们提出了两个有助于理解这些现象的分析模型。(C)2000 Elsevier Science B.V.保留所有权利。
We apply the idea of evolution to a spatial model. Prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighbourhoods where players do not optimise but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminative behaviour of players is introduced representing strategies as small automata, which can be in different states against different neighbours. Extensive simulations show that cooperation persists even in a stochastic environment, that players do not always coordinate on risk dominant equilibria in 2 x 2 coordination games, and that success among surviving strategies may differ. We present two analytical models that help understanding of these phenomena. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.