The Dual Effects of Team Contest Design on On-Demand Service Work Schedules
The Dual Effects of Team Contest Design on On-Demand Service Work Schedules
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DOI：
10.1287/serv.2023.0320
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发表时间：
2023-03
期刊：
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Tingting Dong;Xiaotong Sun;Qi Luo;Jian Wang;Yafeng Yin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tingting Dong;Xiaotong Sun;Qi Luo;Jian Wang;Yafeng Yin
新兴的按需服务平台(OSP)最近将团队合作作为一种战略，以刺激员工的生产率和调解暂时的供需失衡。本研究探讨考虑工作时间安排的团队竞赛方案设计问题。在OSP上引入团队创建了一个等级森严的单领导多追随者游戏。领导者(平台)建立奖励和内部收入分享规则来分配员工的收益。每个追随者(团队)通过协调其团队成员的时间表来与其他人竞争，以最大化总的预期效用。团队间竞争和团队内协调的并存导致了双重效应，这种双重效应可以通过对追随者博弈的均衡分析来捕捉。为了使平台的利益与员工不同的工作时间偏好保持一致，我们提出了一个利润最大化的竞赛方案，该方案由赢家奖励和时变支付组成。一种结合贝叶斯优化、对偶和惩罚方法的新算法解决了非凸均衡约束问题的最优方案。我们的结果表明，团队合作是一种有用的策略，但也有局限性。在拟议的计划下，团队竞赛总是让工人受益。内部协调帮助团队战略性地减轻工人之间过度竞争所造成的负面外部性。对于平台来说，当工人对市场的感知不准确时，最优方案可以将团队的日程安排引向更有利可图的市场均衡。历史：这篇论文曾被《服务科学》特刊接受，该特刊是关于交通城市服务的创新。资助：这项工作得到了国家科学基金会[FW-HTF-P 2222806]的资助。补充材料：在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2023.0320上找到。
Emerging on-demand service platforms (OSPs) have recently embraced teamwork as a strategy for stimulating workers’ productivity and mediating temporal supply and demand imbalances. This research investigates the team contest scheme design problem considering work schedules. Introducing teams on OSPs creates a hierarchical single-leader multi-follower game. The leader (platform) establishes rewards and intrateam revenue-sharing rules for distributing workers’ payoffs. Each follower (team) competes with others by coordinating the schedules of its team members to maximize the total expected utility. The concurrence of interteam competition and intrateam coordination causes dual effects, which are captured by an equilibrium analysis of the followers’ game. To align the platform’s interest with workers’ heterogeneous working-time preferences, we propose a profit-maximizing contest scheme consisting of a winner’s reward and time-varying payments. A novel algorithm that combines Bayesian optimization, duality, and a penalty method solves the optimal scheme in the nonconvex equilibrium-constrained problem. Our results indicate that teamwork is a useful strategy with limitations. Under the proposed scheme, team contest always benefits workers. Intrateam coordination helps teams strategically mitigate the negative externalities caused by overcompetition among workers. For the platform, the optimal scheme can direct teams’ schedules toward more profitable market equilibria when workers have inaccurate perceptions of the market. History: This paper has been accepted for the Service Science Special Issue on Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant FW-HTF-P 2222806]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2023.0320 .