Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy
Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy
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DOI：
10.1145/2892555
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发表时间：
2011-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yiling Chen;Stephen Chong;Ian A. Kash;T. Moran;S. Vadhan
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文献类型：
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作者：
Yiling Chen;Stephen Chong;Ian A. Kash;T. Moran;S. Vadhan
最近的研究构建了既真实又不同私密性的经济机制。在这些机制中，隐私与真实性是分开对待的；它并没有被整合到玩家的效用函数中（在某些情况下，这样做会导致不真实）。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种新的、通用的方法来建模玩家效用函数中的隐私。具体地说,我们只假设,如果一个球员的属性,任何报告结果我将会导致o大约相同的概率,然后啊,有一个小隐私我成本的球员。我们给三个机制,真实的对我们的隐私:建模为一个选举的两位候选人之间,为一个离散的设施选址问题的版本,和一般的社会选择问题离散实用程序(通过VCG-like机制)。随着玩家数量n的增加，我们的机制所获得的社会福利将趋于最优（作为n的一小部分）。
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players’ utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players’ utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has a small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).