Defending critical infrastructure
Defending critical infrastructure
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DOI：
10.1287/inte.1060.0252
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发表时间：
2006-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wood, Kevin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brown, Gerald;Carlyle, Matthew;Wood, Kevin
我们应用新的双层和三层优化模型，使关键基础设施对恐怖袭击更具弹性。每个模型都有一个智能攻击者（恐怖分子）和一个防御者（美国），信息透明，以及攻击者和防御者的顺序动作。我们以美国战略石油储备、亚利桑那州尤马的美国边境巡逻队和电力传输系统为例进行说明。最后，我们报告的见解，从建模经验和许多“红队”的练习。每次演习都收集真实世界基础设施系统的开源数据，开发适当的双层或三层模型，并使用这些模型来识别系统中的漏洞或规划最佳防御。
We apply new bilevel and trilevel optimization models to make critical infrastructure more resilient against terrorist attacks. Each model features an intelligent attacker (terrorists) and a defender (us), information transparency, and sequential actions by attacker and defender. We illustrate with examples of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the US Border Patrol at Yuma, Arizona, and an electrical transmission system. We conclude by reporting insights gained from the modeling experience and many "red-team" exercises. Each exercise gathers open-source data on a real-world infrastructure system, develops an appropriate bilevel or trilevel model, and uses these to identify vulnerabilities in the system or to plan an optimal defense.