Compatibility and the Product Life Cycle in Two-Sided Markets
Compatibility and the Product Life Cycle in Two-Sided Markets
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DOI：
10.1515/rne-2013-0011
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Maruyama;Yusuke Zennyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Maruyama;Yusuke Zennyo
我们考虑一个案例，其中两个竞争的硬件设备和内容供应商各自选择是否使其内容与对方的设备兼容。我们的主要结论是，这些选择的结果取决于公司的主要利润来源是来自硬件设备的销售，还是来自内容销售的版税。如果硬件是主要的利润来源，那么不兼容就是主要的策略。如果版税是主要的利润来源，那么兼容性就是主要的策略。在产品生命周期中，哪种情况可能会发生变化。我们通过展示双边市场中兼容性的均衡结构来补充文献。
Abstract We consider a case in which two competing suppliers of hardware devices and content each chooses whether to make its content compatible with the other’s device. Our main result is that the outcome of these choices depends upon whether the firms’ major source of profit lies in the sale of hardware devices or in royalties from the sale of content. If the hardware is the main source of profit then incompatibility is a dominant strategy. If royalties are the main source of profit then compatibility is the dominant strategy. Which of these situations attains is likely to change over the product life cycle. We add to the literature by showing the equilibrium structure of compatibility in a two-sided market.