Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency

Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency
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重新考虑证明：无限地平线时间不一致的改进

DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Kocherlakota
N. Kocherlakota
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
N. Kocherlakota

文献摘要

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本文研究了一个游戏，其中具有不一致偏好的无限寿命决策者随着时间的推移做出选择。该博弈通常有许多子博弈完美均衡；我描述了子游戏完美性的改进，我称之为“重新考虑证明”。总是存在一个证明重新考虑的均衡，并且所有证明重新考虑的均衡路径都为决策者提供相同的效用。我通过证明政策博弈中的可持续均衡（如 Chari 和 Kehoe，1990 年所定义）与跨期不一致选择问题中的子博弈完美均衡之间的等价结果，证明了复议证明性与宏观经济政策博弈相关。《经济文献杂志》分类号：C73、D91、E61。
This paper examines a game in which an infinitely lived decision maker with inconsistent preferences makes choices over time. There are typically many subgame perfect equilibria to this game; I describe a refinement of subgame perfection that I term reconsideration-proofness. There is always a reconsideration-proof equilibrium and all reconsideration-proof equilibrium paths provide the same utility to the decision maker. I show that reconsideration-proofness is relevant for macroeconomic policy games by proving an equivalence result between sustainable equilibria in policy games (as defined by Chari and Kehoe, 1990) and subgame perfect equilibria in intertemporally inconsistent choice problems.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D91, E61.