Multiple blockholders and earnings management
Multiple blockholders and earnings management
复制标题
多个大股东和盈余管理
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101689
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发表时间：
2020-10-01
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Wang, Xue
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, Fuxiu;Ma, Yunbiao;Wang, Xue
本文研究了当控股股东与其他股东之间存在主要利益冲突时，多个大股东对盈余管理的影响。本文以2000 - 2017年中国上市公司为样本，在控制潜在样本选择和内生性的前提下，发现多个控股股东的公司比单一控股股东的公司更倾向于盈余管理。多个大股东对盈余管理的积极影响在这些大股东是同一类型时更加明显-国有或私有。大股东数量越多，其他大股东相对控股股东的持股比例越高，盈余管理也越强。研究结果与控制权成本分担假说相一致，即其他大股东与控股股东按比例分担盈余管理成本，而不分担控制权私人收益。进一步的检验表明，在内部治理和外部治理较强的公司中，多个大股东与盈余管理之间的正相关关系并不显著。总体而言，本文从财务报告质量的角度论证了多个大股东的潜在阴暗面。
This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type - state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.