The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
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当接受提案需要少于一致批准时，风险偏好在讨价还价中的作用
DOI：
10.1007/bf00056369
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发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
J. Harrington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Harrington
风险偏好的作用，在确定谈判的结果进行审查的情况下，接受一项建议，需要不到一致的批准。使用的n-代理扩展的Ståhl-Rubinstein交替提供模型，我们发现，风险偏好发挥了根本不同的作用时，讨价还价是解决使用nonconsistency投票规则。风险偏好不仅决定了代理人的保留价格，也决定了他成为获胜联盟一部分的可能性。这种分析的一个含义是，当代理人的偏好不是太多样化时，代理人相对规避风险是有利的。
The role of risk preferences in determining the outcome to bargaining is examined for the case in which acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval. Using an n-agent extension of the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating offer model, we find that risk preferences play a fundamentally different role when bargaining is settled using a nonunanimity voting rule. Risk preferences determine not only an agent's reservation price but also the likelihood that he is made part of the winning coalition. An implication of this analysis is that when the preferences of the agents are not too diverse, it is advantageous for an agent to be relatively risk-averse.