Secure Multi-party Computation: Information Flow of Outputs and Game Theory

Secure Multi-party Computation: Information Flow of Outputs and Game Theory
复制标题

安全多方计算:输出信息流和博弈论

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
The post
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
M. Huth
M. Huth
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Patrick Ah;M. Huth

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

安全多方计算使协议参与者能够计算其私有输入的公共函数的输出,同时保护其输入的机密性。但是这样的输出,作为其输入的函数,不可避免地会泄露一些关于输入值的信息,而不管使用什么协议来计算它。我们介绍了量化和理解这种泄漏如何影响欺骗性协议参与者及其目标参与者的输入行为的基础。我们的模型捕捉了参与者对其他参与者可能选择的输入值的信念和知识。在该模型中,引入了协议参与者之间可能产生的信息流的度量,并对其进行了正式调查和实验评估。这些信息理论测量不仅表明了欺骗参与者对目标参与者所选输入的信念的最佳更新的有利输入行为。它们还允许目标量化其输入选择的信息流风险。我们表明,这种方法支持博弈论公式,其中欺骗的攻击者希望在计算输出已知的情况下最大化他们从目标输入中获得的信息,而目标希望保护其输入的隐私。
Secure multiparty computation enables protocol participants to compute the output of a public function of their private inputs whilst protecting the confidentiality of their inputs. But such an output, as a function of its inputs, inevitably leaks some information about input values regardless of the protocol used to compute it. We introduce foundations for quantifying and understanding how such leakage may influence input behaviour of deceitful protocol participants as well as that of participants they target. Our model captures the beliefs and knowledge that participants have about what input values other participants may choose. In this model, measures of information flow that may arise between protocol participants are introduced, formally investigated, and experimentally evaluated. These information-theoretic measures not only suggest advantageous input behaviour to deceitful participants for optimal updates of their beliefs about chosen inputs of targeted participants. They also allow targets to quantify the information-flow risk of their input choices. We show that this approach supports a game-theoretic formulation in which deceitful attackers wish to maximise the information that they gain on inputs of targets once the computation output is known, whereas the targets wish to protect the privacy of their inputs.
DOI: 10.3233/jcs-2007-15302
发表时间: 2007-01-01
影响因子: 1.2
作者:
Clark, David;Hunt, Sebastian;Malacaria, Pasquale
通讯作者: Malacaria, Pasquale
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0449-x
发表时间: 2010-01-01
期刊: ECONOMIC THEORY
影响因子: 1.3
作者:
Avis, David;Rosenberg, Gabriel D.;von Stengel, Bernhard
通讯作者: von Stengel, Bernhard