Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
复制标题
与美国军事学院的（选择的部门）合同相匹配
DOI：
10.3982/ecta10570
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
T. Switzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tayfun Sönmez;T. Switzer
分支选择是学员军事生涯中的一个关键决定。USMA的学员可以通过延长服务协议来提高他们的分支优先级。这个现实生活中的匹配问题填补了市场设计文献中的一个重要空白。虽然优先级不满足关键替代条件，但代理最优稳定机制是明确定义的，与当前的USMA机制相比，它是公平的，稳定的和防策略的。采用这一机制有利于学员和军队。这一新的应用表明，与合同模型的匹配实际上是相关的传统领域，满足替代条件。
Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real-life matching problem fills an important gap in market design literature. Although priorities fail a key substitutes condition, the agent-optimal stable mechanism is well-defined, and in contrast to the current USMA mechanism it is fair, stable, and strategy-proof. Adoption of this mechanism benefits cadets and the Army. This new application shows that matching with contracts model is practically relevant beyond traditional domains that satisfy the substitutes condition.