A Socially Efficient Water Tariff Under the English Optional Metering Scheme
A Socially Efficient Water Tariff Under the English Optional Metering Scheme
复制标题
英国选择性计量方案下的社会效益水价
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Moffatt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tatsuki Ueda;P. Moffatt
我们在英国的制度背景下设计了一种社会高效的水费，在英国，水表计量在很大程度上是可选的，而非水表计量的家庭是按其财产的应课差饷价值（RV）的比例征收的。在这种情况下，理论上证明：RV越大，家庭越有可能选择计量；RV越大，计量的需求效应越小（DEM，即计量导致的用水量下降）。这两个假设通过计量经济学分析得到了证实，计量经济学分析使用的数据集是由一家在英格兰东安格利亚运营的自来水公司提供的。结果表明了一个逆向选择问题：富裕的家庭更有可能选择电表，然而一旦安装了电表，他们预计会显示出较小的DEM。为了克服这个问题，我们建议对计量家庭征收两部分的关税，包括：按用水量比例以统一价格征收可变费用；累进的长期收费将加重富裕家庭的负担。后一部分在实现计量的社会效率方面具有潜在的重要作用，它鼓励较贫穷的家庭安装电表，同时阻止较富裕的家庭安装电表。最优的两部分关税是经验确定的。
We design a socially-efficient water tariff in the institutional context of England, where water metering is largely optional and non-metered households are levied proportional to the rateable value (RV) of their property. Within this context, it is theoretically demonstrated that: the larger the RV, the more likely the household to opt for metering; and the larger the RV, the smaller the Demand Effect of Metering (DEM; the fall in water consumption resulting from metering). These two hypotheses are confirmed with econometric analyses using datasets provided by a water company operating in East Anglia, England. The results signify an adverse-selection problem: wealthier households are more likely to opt for metering, yet they are expected to exhibit a smaller DEM once a meter is installed. In order to overcome this, we propose a two-part tariff for metered households consisting of: a variable charge levied proportional to water consumption at a uniform price; and a progressive standing charge to place a heavier burden on wealthier households. The latter component has a potentially major role in attaining social efficiency of metering, by encouraging poorer households to install meters whilst discouraging wealthier ones. The optimal two-part tariff is determined empirically.