Aggregating Citizen Preferences for Public Projects Through Civic Crowdfunding
Aggregating Citizen Preferences for Public Projects Through Civic Crowdfunding
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发表时间：
2019-05
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通讯作者：
Sankarshan Damle;Moin Hussain Moti;Praphul Chandra;Sujit Gujar
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作者：
Sankarshan Damle;Moin Hussain Moti;Praphul Chandra;Sujit Gujar
我们专注于通过公民众筹聚合公民对公共项目的偏好。现有的公民众筹机制只考虑对公共项目有正面评价的代理人。此外，这些机制假设每个代理都有一个关于项目供应的对称信念。由于公共项目的目标是迎合大多数人，所以只有在大多数人喜欢的情况下才应该提供。为了纳入负面估值，我们提出了一种方法，将现有的公民众筹机制转化为积极偏好，以迎合拥有两种类型代理人的市场。具体来说，我们采用现有的PPR和PPS机制来设计PPRN和PPSN，激励代理根据自己的偏好来支持或反对项目的规定。此外，为了解决信念不对称问题，我们提出了一种基于鲁棒贝叶斯真值血清（RBTS）机制的基于信念的奖励方案。BBR根据代理人对项目提供的信任来奖励他们。利用这种奖励方案，我们引入了一种公民众筹的一般机制，该机制允许对项目提供不对称信念的代理，并激励他们为项目提供贡献。我们设计了两个新的机制，即PPRx和PPSx，分别采用PPR和PPS来说明一般机制，并证明在这两个机制中项目都是在均衡状态下供应的。
We focus on the aggregation of citizen preferences for public projects through civic crowdfunding. Existing civic crowdfunding mechanisms consider only agents with positive valuation towards the public project. Moreover, these mechanisms assume that each agent has a symmetric belief about the project getting provisioned. As public projects aim to cater to the majority, they should be provisioned only if the majority prefers it. To incorporate negative valuations, we propose a methodology to convert existing civic crowdfunding mechanisms for positive preferences to cater to markets having both types of agents. Specifically, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms to design PPRN and PPSN, that incentivize agents to contribute towards or against the project's provision: based on their preference. Besides, to address asymmetric beliefs, we propose a novel reward scheme, Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS) mechanism. BBR rewards agents based on their belief towards the project's provision. Using this reward scheme, we introduce a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which allows for agents having asymmetric beliefs towards the project getting provisioned and incentivizes them to contribute towards the project's provision. We illustrate the general mechanism by designing two novel mechanisms, namely PPRx and PPSx, adapting PPR and PPS respectively, and prove that in both the mechanisms the project is provisioned at equilibrium.