Food-Sharing Networks in Lamalera, Indonesia: Status, Sharing, and Signaling.
Food-Sharing Networks in Lamalera, Indonesia: Status, Sharing, and Signaling.
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印度尼西亚拉马莱拉的食物共享网络：现状、共享和信号。
DOI：
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.003
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nolin,DavidA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nolin,DavidA
昂贵的信号被认为是解释觅食群体食物分享的可能机制。这种分享作为信号的假设预测了分享和地位之间的联系。利用指数随机图模型，这一预测在印度尼西亚Lamalera渔村和海上狩猎村的家庭间食物共享关系的社会网络上进行了测试。先前的分析（Nolin, 2010）。印度尼西亚拉马莱拉的食物共享网络：互惠、亲缘关系和距离。《人性》（21,243-268）表明，在拉马莱拉，大多数的分享行为都符合互惠利他主义。这里要解决的问题是，是否有任何额外的变化可以解释为高地位家庭的分享信号。结果表明，地位高的家庭比其他家庭付出和接受的都多，这种模式更符合互惠利他主义，而不是昂贵的信号。然而，一旦回报倾向和家庭生产力得到控制，男性担任领导职位的家庭与非领导职位的家庭相比，显示出更大的不回报的可能性。这种领导者过度给予的模式与“分享即信号”假说是一致的。富裕家庭表现出相反的模式，比其他家庭付出更少，接受更多。这些家庭可能会以食物以外的货币作为回报，或者他们的财富可能会吸引其他人的寻求帮助的行为。总体而言，社会地位协变量在整个共享网络中解释的变化很小，而且社会地位高的家庭所观察到的大部分共享都可以用解释其他家庭共享的相同因素来最好地解释。这一模式表明，在Lamalera，多种机制可能同时起作用以促进共享，即使在主要由其他机制维持的共享机制中，信号传导也可能激发某些个体的一些共享。
Costly signaling has been proposed as a possible mechanism to explain food sharing in foraging populations. This sharing-as-signaling hypothesis predicts an association between sharing and status. Using exponential random graph modeling, this prediction is tested on a social network of between-household food-sharing relationships in the fishing and sea-hunting village of Lamalera, Indonesia. Previous analyses (Nolin, 2010. Food-sharing networks in Lamalera, Indonesia: reciprocity, kinship, and distance. Human Nature 21, 243–268) have shown that most sharing in Lamalera is consistent with reciprocal altruism. The question addressed here is whether any additional variation may be explained as sharing-as-signaling by high-status households. The results show that high-status households both give and receive more than other households, a pattern more consistent with reciprocal altruism than costly signaling. However, once the propensity to reciprocate and household productivity are controlled, households of men holding leadership positions show greater odds of unreciprocated giving when compared to households of nonleaders. This pattern of excessive giving by leaders is consistent with the sharing-as-signaling hypothesis. Wealthy households show the opposite pattern, giving less and receiving more than other households. These households may reciprocate in a currency other than food, or their wealth may attract favor-seeking behavior from others. Overall, status covariates explain little variation in the sharing network as a whole, and much of the sharing observed by high-status households is best explained by the same factors that explain sharing by other households. This pattern suggests that multiple mechanisms may operate simultaneously to promote sharing in Lamalera and that signaling may motivate some sharing by some individuals even within sharing regimes primarily maintained by other mechanisms.