Learning aspiration in repeated games
Learning aspiration in repeated games
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.001
复制
发表时间：
2005-10-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Matsui, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cho, IK;Matsui, A
我们研究了有限理性代理人的无限重复对称2x2博弈，他们遵循一个简单的经验法则：如果当前收益超过过去收益的平均值，每个代理人继续玩相同的动作，否则切换到另一个动作，概率为正。通过应用随机逼近技巧，我们刻画了所有2x2对策的渐近结果。例如，在囚徒困境游戏中，当且仅当从叛逃到合作的收益是“适度的”时，参与者才会在限制内合作。(C)2005 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2x2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we characterize the asymptotic outcomes for all 2x2 games. In the prisoners' dilemma game, for example, the players cooperate in the limit if and only if the gain from defecting against cooperation is "modest." (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.