THE MORAL COSTS OF NASTINESS

THE MORAL COSTS OF NASTINESS
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DOI:
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00309.x
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发表时间:
2011-04-01
期刊:
影响因子:
1.8
通讯作者:
Herrmann, Benedikt
Herrmann, Benedikt
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Abbink, Klaus;Herrmann, Benedikt

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We introduce two variants of the one-shot joy-of-destruction minigame (mini-JOD). Two players are endowed with the same amount of money. They simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce the other player's payoff at an own cost. In one treatment there was a probability that nature would destroy the opponent's money anyway. We test whether this feature reduces the moral costs of nastiness, and find that destruction rates rise significantly, despite the absence of strategic reasons. (JEL C72, C91, D03).