The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency
The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency
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DOI:
10.1016/0047-2727(72)90021-7
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发表时间:
1972-04
影响因子:
9.8
通讯作者:
A. Atkinson;A. Atkinson;J. Stiglitz;J. Stiglitz
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Atkinson;A. Atkinson;J. Stiglitz;J. Stiglitz
A number of criteria for evaluating alternative tax structures have been proposed:(a) efficiency;(b) equity;(c) administrative simplicity;(d) flexibility (usefulness for stabilization policies). This paper focuses primarily on the first of these considerations, since it is the efficiency aspects that have received most attention. The analysis does, however, have important implications for the conflict between efficiency and equity and these are discussed briefly in the final section.(In a sequel to this paper, the distributional arguments and the relationship between direct and indirect taxation are examined in more detail.) The last two considerations-administrative simplicity and flexibility-are not discussed, but it should be emphasised that this does not imply that in our judgment these other effects are not of importance. Against any gains from differentiation on the first two accounts must be set some judgment of the political’and economic benefits to be had from the simpler administrative structure associated with uniform taxes.’In particular, once the principle of differentiation is accepted, the tax system may be subjected to the pressures of special interest groups; each group would argue that special considerations dictate that the tax on its commodity(its factor use) be lowered. The tax structure eventually emerging might well be based as much on relative strengths of these-pressure groups as on relative dead weight losses.