A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs
A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs
复制标题
平衡联盟和贸易集团的联盟形成方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Sengupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Burbidge;J. DePater;Gordon M. Myers;A. Sengupta
作者开发了一个模型，在该模型中，各国可以选择组建联盟，以从政策协调中获取效率收益。加入联盟需要设定政策变量，以使联盟在纳什均衡下相对于非成员的总收益最大化，并承诺采用转移计划来分享收益。具有两种状态，独特的平衡结构是完全联邦；对于两个以上的状态，不完全联邦可以是唯一的平衡。从关税同盟的角度解释这一结果，即使关税同盟内部存在合作和转移，贸易集团形成的趋势也可能是均衡行为。美国经济协会版权所有 1997。
The authors develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination. Joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition's aggregate payoff at a Nash equilibrium against nonmembers and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains. With two states, the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation; with more than two states, incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium. Interpreting this result in terms of custom unions, the trend to trading-bloc formation may be equilibrium behavior even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.