The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012
The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012
复制标题
军事行动中学习的局限性：2007-2012 年阿富汗北部挪威军队自下而上的适应
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Haaland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Haaland
本文基于对挪威省级重建队(PRT)指挥官的采访和挪威武装部队的经验教训数据库，认为在战争中似乎无法或不愿学习和适应的情况可能有其他解释。经验的模糊性使得课程对令人困惑的事件有争议性、矛盾性和流畅的解释。因此，它们没有为适应提供明确的指导。即使吸取的经验教训相当明确并得到商定，适应也不会自动随之而来，因为部队自主权可能相当有限，至少对小国而言，在与土著部队合作开展的联军行动中是如此。
ABSTRACTThis article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.